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 The idea that environmental resources, like lakes, constitute infrastructure 
captures an important aspect of environmental resources’ value to society.  Indeed, 
collectively environmental resources constitute a life support system, providing an 
infrastructure not just for human beings, but for all forms of life.   In this essay I explore 
the infrastructure commons idea’s potential to improve both environmental and 
intellectual property law.  I find that its value for environmental law is very similar to the 
value Professor Lessig ascribed to it for intellectual property law, as a valuable framing 
idea that may productively influence public policy.1  My aim here is to highlight 
extensions that may be needed to enable this idea to have the influence on public policy 
that it should have, emphasizing the need to focus on the economic dynamics of law in 
applying the idea to resource management decisions.2     
I.  The Value of Considering Environmental as Resources 
 As Professor Frischman recognizes, his infrastucture commons idea primarily 
influences the framing of resource management problems.3   This framing, as Frischman 
suggests, has something in common with the movement within ecological economics to 
identify and value the “ecosystem services” that lakes and other environmental resources 
                                                 
1 See Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischman, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
2 See generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE  ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003); 
Symposium:  Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and Static Efficiency, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 501-616 (2004). 
3 See Brett M Frischman, An Economic theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917, 984 (2005) (claiming that “classifying a lake as infrastucture frames” the resource management 
problem in “broader fashion.”) 
provide.4  The core of Frischman’s infrastructure definition highlights infrastructure’s 
ability to provide an input into a wide variety of public and private goods.5  The 
ecosystem services idea involves looking at the value of some of the provided public 
goods.  For example, wetlands provide water filtration and flood protection services.  
Economists can estimate the value of these services by observing the prices paid for 
water filtration plants and dikes.  This ecosystem services approach emphasizes 
environmental resources’ provision of services to human beings, just as the infrastructure 
idea does.  The infrastucture idea adds to this idea by emphasizing the diversity and 
nature of these benefits and therefore captures something important about why we need 
to protect environmental resources.   
 This framing is not a trivial gain.  If I dive into a lake I notice instantly that it 
contains water.  While Professor Frischman gazing at Lake Michigan from a Chicago 
park bench may see infrastructure, some of Professor Rose’s neighbors in Arizona may 
see water, a rivalrous good that might not qualify as infrastructure.  Viewing Lake 
Michigan as a lake may, as Professor Frischman says, “allow us to appreciate the 
resource as part of a complex resource system.”6 
 Making Lake Michigan a “part of a complex resource system,” however, may 
require an extension of the infrastructure idea to explicitly incorporate concepts of scale 
and networks, concepts familiar to intellectual property scholars.  Lake Michigan by itself 
constitutes infrastructure.  But Professor Frischman’s invocation of a more wholistic 
vision suggests a new principle not explicitly flagged in the article, i.e. that we have to 
                                                 
4  Id. at 988 (explaining that many environmental resources, including lakes, offer “ecosystem services.”). 
5 Id. at 974 (characterizing infrastructure’s generation of inputs into a wide variety of processes generating 
significant social benefits as the “key insights” from his analysis). 
6 Id. at 990. 
recognize the value of entire networks of resources.  And to do this we must incorporate 
another principle, a demand that we view the network on the broadest possible scale.  
Otherwise, we may fail to appreciate even currently observable positive externalities 
associated with infrastructure.   
II.  Infrastructure and Governance. 
 I share Frischman’s concern that privatization may not work well, because 
important positive externalities do not produce appropriable gains. But why is that so?  
And would the government appreciate these positive externalities when private parties 
would not?   
 Professor Frischman suggests that some services provided by “infrastructure 
resources” are “difficult to observe, much less appropriate.”7  He emphasizes the 
appropriation problem in favoring common access solutions.  But if a benefit is difficult 
to observe, then public resource managers may neglect it as well.  He also states that 
markets will tend not to realize positive externalities when “they cannot be easily 
valued.”8  This raises a question about whether government adequately secures benefits 
that resist valuation.  I think this problem of difficult to observe and quantify 
infrastructure resources poses challenges for governments as well as for private actors 
that places some strain on any economic theory, even one as enlightened as the 
infrastructure commons theory.     
 Professor Frischman’s theory has implications not just for showing us where 
private markets might fail, but also for thinking about how to avoid government failure to 
adequately protect the values infrasctucture commons provide.  At a minimum, it implies 
                                                 
7  Id. at 988. 
8 Id. at 989. 
that governments should not emulate markets.  If government bases its actions only on 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis it, like private owners of infrastructure, will fail to take 
into account positive externalities that are difficult to observe and quantify.   
 This is a significant conclusion.  In The Economic Dynamics of Environmental 
Law (MIT Press 2003), I explained that most of government these days is based on two 
principles, privatize whenever possible, and rely on market emulation whenever this is 
not possible.9  The market emulation project includes heavy reliance on quantitative cost-
benefit analysis to make very fundamental decisions.10  Lawrence Lessig in a similar vain 
characterizes the instinctive reliance on private ordering as a key idea taken for granted in 
government decision-making.11  Recognition that managing infrastructure requires 
sensitivity to multiple difficult to evaluate positive externalities calls this whole 
privatization project into question for an important category of resources. 
 Once we realize, however, that Frischman’s recognition of the importance of 
positive externalities that are difficult to detect and value calls cost-benefit analysis into 
question, however, we are left with a puzzle.  How should government make 
management decisions, such as decisions about how to address internet and broadband 
access and how to manage warming global air space?   
III.  Toward Economic Dynamic Analysis of the Management of the Infrastructure 
Commons. 
 Frischman’s work suggests some emphasis on qualitative, not just quantitative 
analysis.  He calls for a better understanding of how infrastructure resources create value 
                                                 
9 See DRIESEN, supra note __, at 2. 
10 ID. at 1. 
11 See Lessig, supra note ___, at 1031. 
for society because of their role in complex dynamic systems.12  And he calls for 
comparative institutional analysis.13  I agree with both of these points and propose an 
extension to move toward a more complete picture of what such an analysis might look 
like.  
 The comparative institutional analysis that Professor Frischman calls for should 
consider prominently the shape of change over time.14  Even when we cannot quantify 
the most important costs and benefits of a change in a legal regime, we can evaluate the 
general shape of changes that these changes would likely lead to over time.15  We can 
carefully evaluate the economic incentives that various regimes create in their 
institutional context.16  This implies noticing which incentives will most likely actually 
motivate key actors, not simply noting what incentives exist.17  Most actors respond to 
incentives through bounded rationality, paying attention only to the incentives and 
information that their habits and routines make salient.18  We can use this analysis to 
predict the direction of changes over time and choose paths leading toward desirable sorts 
of change. 
 This sort of analysis, which I call economic dynamic analysis, provides an 
alternative to a myopic focus on static efficiency, which matches supply and demand for 
a given technological state.19  It instead emphasizes careful thinking about the second 
                                                 
12 See Frischman, supra note ___, at 1023. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally DRIESEN, supra note __, at 6 (stating that economic dynamics focuses upon change over 
time) 
15 See ID. at 7-8. 
16 ID. at 8. 
17 ID. 
18 ID. 
19 ID. at 4. 
pillar of law and economics, economic incentives, which almost everybody talks about, 
but few legal scholars think about in a systematic way.       
 I demonstrated in the Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law how these ideas 
might reshape thinking about environmental law and about regulated industry.20  The 
book shows, for example, how economic dynamic analysis can help us address issues 
raised by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21  I show how this analysis highlights and 
helps us think about the issue of whether the policy of universal service, which remained 
entrenched in the Act, can survive the competition-based regime that constitutes the Act’s 
centerpiece.     
  The idea of Economic Dynamic describes the deep structure of what a lot of 
perceptive legal analysts do.  For example, Professor Lessig in The Future of Ideas 
implicitly relies on an economic dynamic analysis grounded in the concept of bounded 
rationality to argue for an open infrastructure commons (in Frischman’s terms).  The idea 
of bounded rationality, an important antidote to theories based on perfect information, 
claims that economic actors cannot possibly process all of the information available and 
therefore rely on rules of thumb to ferret out the limited information they will pay 
attention to.  Because of this screening, understanding the precise limits of bounded 
rationality for a particular individual or institution can help predict various economic 
incentives’ effects and hence guide choices about institutional arrangements.   
 Lessig implicitly invokes bounded rationality when he notes that the founders of 
the net could not know what sort of innovations it might spawn.22  This bound upon 
                                                 
 20 See DRIESEN, supra note __.  
 21 See ID. at 206-207.  
 22 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEA:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 88-89 (2001).   
rationality makes optimization of the net for particular applications a poor choice.  
Because the internet’s founders could not intelligently optimize the net for innovations 
they could not identify, they relied on a “dumb” end-to-end design, which makes it easy 
for end-users to use the commons of the net as an innovation platform.23  Lessig then 
uses, apparently unconsciously, the notion of path dependency, another pillar of 
economic dynamic theory,24 to further his argument.  Building (as I do as well) on the 
work of Clay Christensen, the author of The Innovator’s Dilemma, he shows how path 
dependency limits the innovation capacity of established companies.  He shows that 
companies tend to become expert in refining the technologies they know about and 
serving the markets they have helped create, but can easily miss opportunities for 
innovation that would disrupt these markets.25  He fears that established firm’s path 
dependent bounded rationality and the economic incentive they have to discourage 
disruptive technology can lead to the squashing of innovation.26  Therefore, he suggests, 
leaving the infrastructure commons of the net open might be a very good idea.27  When 
we have little understanding of how a resource might be used, we should favor disruption 
by leaving it in the commons, says Lessig.28  This idea closely tracks another pillar of 
economic dynamic analysis, Douglas North’s idea of adaptive efficiency.29  When we 
cannot sum relevant costs and benefits we should choose the option that maximizes our 
future flexibility, our ability to grow and experiment.30    His analysis does exactly what 
the Economic Dynamic theory recommends, uses analysis of economic incentives based 
                                                 
 23 ID. at 88-89.  
 24 See DRIESEN, supra note ___, at 7.   
 25 See LESSIG, supra note ___, at 89-91.  
 26 ID. at 91-92.  
 27 ID. at 92.    
 28 ID. at 88-92.  
 29 See DRIESEN, supra note __, at 7.  
 30 ID.  
on bounded rationality and path dependence to predict the shape of change over time as a 
guide to optimal policy using a concept of adaptive efficiency that works even when we 
cannot quantify salient benefits. 
 Lessig’s comment on Frischman’s theory invites more work on the question of 
how to “measure” the benefits of open access, and characterizes the passage I just 
described as pointing to some factors that are relevant to decisions about an open access 
commons.31  In fact, Frischman’s work can, together with economic dynamic analysis, 
contribute to measuring the benefits of open access, provided that the idea of 
measurement is understood in a limited way.   
 We must first, however, appreciate what measurement must mean in the 
infrastructure commons context.  It cannot mean to quantify.  We need to use an 
economic dynamic theory and the insights of the infrastructure commons idea to reject 
the notion that quantification offers an acceptable even-handed way to measure benefits.  
The wide variety of benefits that an infrastructure commons provides suggests that 
government, which has limited capacity, cannot quantify them all even if quantification is 
possible.  But we cannot quantify the benefits of innovations that we cannot even identify 
or of ecological systems that we only partially understand.  Soft variables, like those 
associated with environmental quality or the communitarian values of the net, tend to get 
lost in such a calculus.  We can, however, predict the shape of change over time using 
economic dynamic analysis.   
 Measurement must involve the construction of a vision of a positive economic 
and social dynamic over time.  Evaluating comparative institutional arrangements does 
require the consideration of both the advantages and disadvantages of possible 
                                                 
 31 Lessig, supra note ___, at 1039 & n. 15.    
architectures.  But framing these advantages as costs and benefits suggests, wrongly, that 
quantification can neutrally evaluate these futures.  I argued in the Economic Dynamics 
of Environmental Law that the static efficiency quantitative economic analysis usually 
aims to achieve, while certainly desirable, is not the key value the public sees in markets.  
The public values innovation and economic growth, and there is a debate in the 
economics literature about whether economic growth and perfect static efficiency are 
compatible.32       
 Economic dynamic analysis of law provides a useful framework for analysis.  It 
may be a prerequisite to measuring the benefits of open access, but it does not, by itself 
measure the benefit of any infrastructure commons.  The infrastructure commons idea, 
however, suggests some fruitful paths for further work that can better evaluate these 
benefits using the Economic Dynamic approach.  In particular, Professor Frischman’s 
definition of infrastructure highlights not just the variety of benefits infrastructure 
delivers, but important aspects of their nature.  He emphasizes that such a commons is, at 
least partially, non-rivalrous.  So, for example, my use of Frischman’s ideas in this essay 
does not in any way limit his use of his ideas.  Indeed, it may, I can ernestly hope, help 
him use his ideas better.  If I went over and took his cup of coffee, that would constitute a 
rivalrous use, as he could no longer drink his cup of coffee.  Well, this suggests that the  
infrastructure commons, as a supplier on nonrivalrous goods can have a multiplier effect 
not present with rivalrous goods.  We can get further by noticing that in many contexts 
some uses of an infrastructure commons are rivalrous, while others are not.  For example, 
when I breathe, I do not limit your use of the air.  When a coal-fired power plant spews 
fine particulate into the atmosphere, it does limit the extent to which you can safely 
                                                 
 32 See DRIESEN, supra note ___, at 4-5.  
breathe.  This suggests that a comparative institutional analysis might evaluate which 
uses on an infrastructure commons have multiplier effects (ideas), which do not create 
scarcity (breathing), and which do create scarcity (pollution). 
    We can use this analysis of the nature of uses of infrastructure to evaluate the 
benefits of open access or access limits when combined with an economic dynamic 
analysis showing how different commons uses influence incentives.  For example, some 
uses of the internet, spam and viruses, are rivalrous in the sense that they impede other 
uses of the net.  We can ask whether over time an open commons would lead these uses 
to seriously diminish the positive values of the resource.  If so, we would need to at least 
evaluate whether an end-to-end architecture is compatible with effectively limiting these 
rivalrous uses that have the capacity to destroy, or at least seriously limit, the common’s 
capacity to deliver benefits.   
 Another idea from the Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law might also 
build on the Frischman framework, the idea that economic dynamic analysis should 
consider whom particular architecture empowers.33  The internet that Professor Lessig so 
admires served a relatively small, albeit rapidly growing, community.   Enabling the 
larger community to use the internet requires capacity increases over time.  An economic 
dynamic analysis must address the question of whether funding this capacity increase is 
consistent with open access.  One must evaluate whether the bounded rationality of those 
adding bandwith will cause them to desist unless they gain some measure of control over 
the architecture.  If they would desist absent some control, then economic dynamic 
analysis can only support open access if a case is made for some alternative way of 
building capacity or focusing the net on a narrower community.  Much more can be said 
                                                 
33 See DRIESEN, supra note __, at 8. 
about this, but I suspect it would be better said by intellectual property experts like Lessig 
and Frischman.  I hope I’ve said enough to show that the infrastructure commons concept 
has the potential to further the economic dynamic analysis of law as a method for 
evaluating institutional choice.       
Conclusion 
 The idea of the infrastructure commons constitutes an important contribution to 
our thinking about the value of both environmental and intellectual resources.  Extensions 
of this idea that build on the concept of the economic dynamics of law have significant 
potential to strengthen analysis of how to properly manage resources that can serve as an 
infrastructure commons.      
 
 
